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Extensive research relating to corporate governance and performance of firms have been carried out, however 
less research has been carried relating to developing countries like Pakistan. The purpose of the study is to 
examine the relationship of corporate governance (CG) tools (board size, board meetings) with performance 
(ROA) of listed textile firms on the Pakistan stock exchange. Leverage (FLEV) has been accommodated as a 
moderator in the study, data has been collected concerning to 30 textile firms from the period 2015 to 2017 and 
multiple regression technique has been employed in the research to assess the relation among corporate 
governance and firm performance. The study found that both board size (BS) and board meetings (BM) have a 
significant impact on the textile firm’s performance, moreover the moderating effect of leverage was found to be 
significant on the relationship between BM and performance of textile, but insignificant on the relationship of 
board size and performance. This study provides helpful information for regulators as well as management of 
textile firms to enhance policies relating to corporate governance ahead.  
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1. Introduction 
Attention on corporate governance (CG) has been expanding throughout the years as favorable corporate 
governance can secure the organization from crisis.  
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Previously the attention of researchers pertaining to corporate governance has been on developed countries and 
little attention has been given to emerging economies like Pakistan which requires research to be carried [1,2].  
The term corporate governance (CG) is known to many in various meanings as corporate governance is to 
establish that the company activities are efficiently managed by also providing fair return to the investors [1].  
Also corporate governance understanding is of something extensive than corporate management, while also 
attaining strategic goals [2]. Compelling corporate governance activities handle shareholders matters, which 
would assure that a company has solid accountability for the organization likewise also compressing the level of 
misuse, extortion and establishing overall success for the company. Similarly feeble corporate governance 
would cause misuse and distrust for the public confidence [3].  
According to Co-operation and Development Report (2004) the world faced abounding scandals like World 
com, Enron for which companies started to focus on concerns of corporate governance, also the collapse of 
Enron and MCI for preserving fraudulent accounts served as the catalyst to new U.S. control or governance as 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which treated to be highly extensive governance control or adjustment in the 
past 70 years [4]. The regulatory authorities for corporate governance in Pakistan for financial sector are being 
governed by the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) whereas the non financial sector’s regulator is the securities and 
exchange commission of Pakistan [5]. State Bank of Pakistan monitors and has provided guidelines to the 
financial sector more effectively than recent years.  According to OECD survey, in 2014 the code and principles 
of corporate governance in Pakistan has been updated. Many contended that corporate governance has a crucial 
part in governing the operations of the firm [8,9]. 
 Corporate governance is an instrument with which administration takes crucial strides to shield the interests or 
significance of related parties. Corporate governance proceedings are used to make sure that control and 
ownership are in independent hands, and this many much of time leads to agency problems [6]. The theory that 
depicts the distinction of interests among managers and shareholders is known to be the “Agency Theory”. A 
concern pertaining to corporate governance is an issue in the modern sector of various emerging countries for 
example, Pakistan. Improved governance allows effective environment for working and it establishes better 
accountability. One of the crucial confrontations in the industrial sector of Pakistan is that of corporate 
governance. Likewise textile sector which is thought to be the Pakistan economies backbone, as it is one the 
biggest sector in Pakistan and contributes to about more than 50% in the GDP and exports [7]. Recently as per 
the data of Pakistan bureau of statistics (PBS) the textile industry of Pakistan has been facing abounding issues 
relating to energy and power crises, increase in cost of production, lack of new investment, low technology base 
and unambiguous law and order situation that caused a severe deterioration of the performance in the global 
market as it lead towards a decline in the growth. Numerous researches have been carried out, but fewer studies 
have been carried out accommodating the collective effect of board size (BS) and board meetings (BM) with 
firm performance. Moreover, the existing literature is dubious and limited on considering the collective impact 
of BS and BM to enhance the company performance, meaning BS has a positive impact on the performance  [5] 
[8], while on the other hand [9] highlighted that it has a negative impact with performance. Likewise, BM have 
a positive impact on the performance [10], while on the other hand [11] highlighted it has negative impact with 





In response to this problem, a research upon the combined association of BS and BM with performance on the 
textile sector of Pakistan is studied. It would be helpful in finding out the central point of corporate governance 
system in Pakistan for the recent years.  The purpose of this research is to assess the relationship of BS and BM 
with performance, also assessing the moderating impact of leverage on the accord among BS and BM with 
performance. Hence with aforementioned framework, the objective of this research is as shown below: 
• To find the relationship between BS and performance of firms. 
• To find the relationship between BM and performance of firms. 
• To find the moderating impact of leverage on the accord among BS and organizations performance. 
• To find the moderating impact of leverage on the accord among BM and organizations performance. 
2. Literature Review 
Agency theory has been established upon the presumption that both principal and agent interest changes and 
principal can diminish the gap of concern by offering certain incentives to the agent also to meet the cost to keep 
an eye on the agent [16,10]. Principal take every measure to avoid from agency problem [12] and one measure is 
to establish the BOD [6] contrasting aspects of the management can aid to accomplish the objective of superb 
governance and conclusively affect financial performance. 
 Board activities are heavily reliant on agency theory as with the passage of time the research on impact of CG 
and performance has been expanding due to importance of corporate governance being realized.To date, 
literature is so diverse and researchers have no consensus about the outcome [13]; CG and performance. [14] 
Reported as that mechanisms relating to governance have sufficient effect on firm performance, likewise [15] 
researched corporate governance effect on firm performance for new technology ventures and reported relevant 
relation among performance and CG.  Moving forwards [8] also reported significant relation among 
mechanisms relating to CG and performance whose research was carried on the firms listed on the Pakistan 
Stock Exchange (PSX).  
Whereas, [16] research pertained to accommodating the use of structural equation model to establish a linkage 
among corporate governance, capital efficiency and performance of firms, reported no direct association among 
CG and firm’s performance. Similarly [17] research pertained to corporate governance (CG), capital structure 
(CS) and performance from the context of Thailand economy, which also included a mediator variable leverage, 
reported that corporate governance is not associated with leverage and firm performance. Nevertheless great 
governance process would lead to better control enhancing the overall efficiency and leading towards better 
performance. Directors play a vital role for superb governance and various researches have been carried out 
using many different characteristics of the board which can be seen in table (1). Hence in this research the CG 
tools which have been used pertain to board size (BS), board meetings (BM) and a moderator as leverage 
(FLEV). 




Table 1: Variables Employed by Researchers 
[14] Board size, outside directors, CEO duality, managerial ownership and ownership concentration 
[18] Board size and Board composition 
[3] Board size and gender diversity 
[19] Board size, proportion of non-directors, directors shareholdings, CEO duality, 
[11] Board meeting frequency 
[20] Board size, activity, and number of commissions, presence of independent directors, board diversity. 
[8] Board size, Board structure, CEO duality, audit committee  
2.1 Board Size (BS), Board Meetings (BM) and Leverage (FLEV) 
Size of the board of directors plays a crucial part in the managements ‘capability to oversee managers [21]. 
According to [5] the link among BS and performance is positive. Similarly [22] found that performance gets 
better with BS for convoluted companies. According to [8] elucidated that BS has a momentous relationship 
among BS and two mechanisms used for firm performance. Whereas [9] conducted a research on CG and 
performance of companies in Iran and highlighted a adverse relation of BS with the performance. Hence overall 
these researches suggest as board size increases the firm performance tends to improve, the reason maybe that as 
board size increases it would lead to employment of better more expertise and responsibility sharing. Also small 
BS may be less effective to monitor the compelling managers. A positive and compelling relationship among 
BM and firm’s performance is reported in a European countries study [23]. Similarly [10] reported boards that 
meet more persistently improve the firm’s financial performance. On the contrary, [24] found board meetings to 
have no relation with performance by taking a lesser sample of 24 firms pertaining to time period 2000-2005. 
According to [24] performance which is associated with efficient management exercises of the company, which 
are less likely affected by the BM’s held by the board. Similarly [11] reports an inverse relationship of number 
of board meetings with the firm performance. Similarly due to the inconsistent findings in the literature where 
different researchers found mixed results of board size, board meetings with performance. Hence the study first 
of all engages to the see the combined effect of BS and BM on performance of companies and second 
accommodates the use of a moderator which is taken as financial leverage which was also has been employed 








Therefore, pertaining with discussion rose above, the successive hypothesis is established: 
H1: There is a significant impact of BS on performance of companies.  
H2: There is a significant impact of BM on performance of companies. 
H3: Financial Leverage has a significant moderating effect on the relationship between BS and performance of 
companies. 
H4: Financial Leverage has a significant moderating effect on the relationship of BM and performance of 
companies. 
3. Materials and Methods 
To determine the impact pertaining to CG tools with companies’ performance, this study employed the 
procedure used in previous research work on the affair, as previous work employed quantitative techniques to 
gather data. The unit of analysis pertains to textile firms and the data has been collected from online websites of 
textile firms from period 2015-2017. Random sample has been drawn while collecting the data; the sample 
includes 30 textile companies and includes the companies as shown in table (2).  
Table 2: Textile Companies 
Name of Textile firm 
Ali Asghar, Allawasaya, Amtex, Babri Cotton, Bhanero, Blessed, Colony, Crescent Cotton, Cresecent Fibers, 
Dar es Salam, DewanFarooque, Din, DM, Elahi Cotton, Ellcot Spinning, Faisal Spinning, Fazal Cloth, Gadoon, 
Ideal Spinning, Islamd, J.A, J.K.Spinning, Janna de Malucho, Khalid Siraj, Kohat, Kohinoor, Maqbool, 
Nadeem, Nagina 
 
The dependent variable which is companies’ performance is being assessed by accommodating a proxy of return 
on assets (ROA). ROA signifies level of revenue a firm is able to derive with relation to the level of assets the 
firm has. ROA has been utilized by various previous researches in finding the accord between CG and 
companies performance. The use of ROA has been employed as an accounting based measure for performance                                               
[30,31]. Similarly the independent variable utilized in the research includes BS which is the overall member of 
boards in the company, BM which is total number of meetings held by the board members and lastly leverage as 
the proportion of liabilities to assets.  
4. Results and Discussion 
Multiple regression technique has been employed in research to determine the relationship of CG tools with 
companies’ performance [23,13]. Where the performance is accommodated by the use of ROA and corporate 




governance tools are utilized by using board size, gender diversity and board meetings for which the model of 
the research pertains to: 
ROA = β0 + β1BS + β2BM 
As: Y has been labeled as the DV; β0 represents intercept; X is labeled as the independent variable. As per the 
analysis of data carried out the results are as follows. 
Table 3: Descriptive Analysis 
 N Min Max Mean Std. Deviation 
ROA 30 -.15 .06 -.0160 .05076 
BS 30 7.00 9.00 7.5333 .81931 
BM 30 4.00 9.00 4.7333 1.28475 
LEV 30 .21 1.35 .6203 .28096 
 
For the use of ease of analysis IBM SPSS software has been utilized. Table (3) represent the summary of 
descriptive which involves the mean, median, minimum, maximum and standard deviation of board size, board 
meetings, leverage and firm performance (ROA) are given. The total number 30 simple relates to the total 
number textile firms which were taken, First of all, BS which is the overall members in the board which display 
the minimum number of members in a board relate to 7 members while the maximum number in a board relate 
to 9 members although the average size of the board pertains to be 7 members which is similar to the study 
based in Pakistan firms reported by [5]. The average number of board meetings pertain to 5, whith a range of 4 
to 15 meetings held by a board, also the S.D of board meetings pertain to 1.95.  Likewise leverage is taken as a 
moderating variable gives a minimial number of 0.21, whereas a maximum of 1.35. Similarly mean leverage 
pertains to be 0.6203. Lastly the performance variable return on assets (ROA) relates to as the average ROA to 
be -0.0143 with values ranging from -0.31 to 0.20. 
Table 4: Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adj R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .556a .310 .258 .04371 
 
Coefficient of determination (r2) as shown in the above table (2) explains that how much variation in the 
dependant variable is elucidated by the predictor variables. Furthermore the value of coefficient of 
determination (r2) ranges from 0 to 1. As per the above table, the value of R is 0.556 (55.6%) which relates to 
strong correlation among board size, board meetings with the performance of textile firms. Moving forward the 




adjusted  value of R square relate to 0.258, meaning that 25.8% of the variation in the performance of textile 
firm is elucidated by board size and board meetings and the rest 74.2% is explained by other factors or variables.  
Table 5: ANOVA 
 
Model Sum of Squ df Mean Square F Sig. 
 
Regression .023 2 .012 6.055 .007b 
Residual .052 27 .002   
Total .075 29    
Similarly table 5 which is the ANOVA table shows the goodness of fit (GOF) of the model, if the value or 
number is greater to 5, hence it is said to be fit model. As from the above table that the value is 6 which show 
the model is a good fit. 
Table 6: Coefficients 
Model UnstandCoeffi StandCoeffi T Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
 
Con -.110 .087  -1.254 .220 
BS .022 .010 .350 2.148 .041 
BM -.015 .006 -.372 -2.286 .030 
The following table (6) which shows the coefficents. Coefficents of both the variables taken in the study are 
shown above. Board size has a significant result as the p value came out to be 0.041 which is less than 0.05, thus 
accepting H1. Likewise board meetings also proved to show a siginificant result as the p value came out to be 
0.030 which is less than 0.05, hence accepting H2. Analysis that has been conducted, leads to the making of the 
following equation: 
ROA =-0.110 + 0.022BS – 0.015BM 
In the above equation or model 
BS = Number of member in the board 
BM = board meetings held by the organization 
The results relating to -0.110 explains as the variable of board size and board meetings remain constant or do 
not change, organization performance is -0.110.  
Secondly, the value relating to the coefficient of board size is 0.022, this relates to explain that a one rise in 
board size would also raise the performance of the firm by 0.022. Lastly, the value relating to the coefficient of 
board meeting is -0.015 which explains that any one increase in the meetings held a year would lead to a -0.015 
decline on organizations performance. 




Table 7: Coefficients 
Model 3 Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
 
(Constant) -.011 .009  -1.268 .215 
moderator_Lev_BM -.011 .005 -.369 -2.099 .045 
 
However the conclusion  gauged out from the analysis of moderating effect on the relationship of BS tested to 
be insignificant as p-value came to 0.8273 in model 2 which is more than 0.05 hence neglecting H3. On he othr 
hand the results gained from analyzing the moderating effect on the accord of BM and company performance 
proved to be significant as the p-value came to 0.045 in model 3 which is less than 0.05 hence accepting H4, as 
shown in the above table (7). 
5. Conclusion  
BS relates to being one of the crucial aspects of CG, as the directors or members of the board are liable to 
support performance of the company, plus also assuring shareholders concerns or interests to be protected. The 
current study does support the hypothesis that BS has a compelling effect on the organizations performance and 
is consistent with the findings of [26]. Even though empirical results on size of board and performance of firms 
are ambiguous, [19] expressed an adverse affair of size of the board with performance of the firm. However the 
findings in the study support the fact that a larger size of the board, meaning more members in the board would 
lead to diversified skills and expertise which would ultimately lead to different views being shared upon various 
matters and ultimately which would lead to enhanced effect of the performance of the organization.  
Likewise the hypothesis pertaining to BM also proved to have a compelling effect on organization performance 
which has been accepted through empirical findings. Even though empirical results on BM and performance of 
firms are ambiguous, where [5] found BM to be insignificant. Whereas [27] found firms with feeble 
performance, increasing the BM held by the management led to enhanced performance, hence it shows that 
firms carrying out more board meetings are efficiently and effectively able to communicate appropriate 
information to the board. Likewise board meetings also reduce costs plus enhancing board members engagement 
in the meetings. The prevailing and the literature which has been studied or considered, displayed a compelling 
or immediate use of effective CG laws and standards in Pakistan. Where as effective CG will lead to reduction 
in debt, bringing in better opportunities for investment in future for organizations in Pakistan, causing future 
prosperity of the Pakistan economy.  The rules of CG have been further revised in 2014 by the SECP, including 
further standards and measures set for the organizations to follow. 
Similarly the moderating effect of leverage shows an insignificant effect on the relationship of BS with 




organization performance, but the moderating impact of leverage demonstrated to have a compelling accord on 
the relationship of BS and organization performance. The prevailing study pertains to include certain 
implications to corporate governance literature. The present study adds in the work carried out for CG aspect 
exclusively from developing countries point. Even though level of governance has improved in Pakistan since 
strict actions have been taken from the perspective of the regulatory authorities SECP. Hence the textile 
organization of Pakistan should adhere to the standards or rules of CG, where CG activities have substantially 
been enhanced in Pakistan, but its full potential still needs to be achieved.  
6. Limitation and Recommendations 
Similarly the present research is not free of limitations as the data pertains for a fewer time period relating to 
two years also the performance sample corresponds to a single sector. Moreover the current study has employed 
only two CG tools relating to BS and BM, Hence further research can be conducted by employing data 
pertaining to the time period from 2001 to 2017 by also accommodating various sectors or companies which are 
listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange. Likewise the accord among CG and organization performance of firms 
can farther be searched by employing board characteristics pertaining to multiple countries to engage a 
comparative study relating to corporate governance standards being followed in different countries. The 
comparative study can also be engaged by incorporating various sectors and involving more CG variables as 
board independence and independence of audit committee, board composition, CEO duality etc. 
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